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Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
The year 2005 is decisive for Kyrgyzstan’s political future. Parliamentary elections at the 
end of February and, even more so, presidential elections in October provide an opportunity 
for the first democratic change of power in Central Asia, because the incumbent President, 
Askar Akaev, has repeatedly stated that he will abide by the constitution and step down. If 
he were to stay, thereby breaking his promises, and in case of electoral fraud, there is a 
possibility for political turmoil in the country, which could spill over into other dimensions 
than the political. The country’s ethnic diversity and its history of interethnic conflict pose a 
certain risk for ethnically motivated violence, if ethnicity were to be exploited irresponsibly 
by political actors for their needs. However, as the successful privatization of agricultural 
land proves, potential dangers can be eliminated if there is enough political will and, if 
necessary, pressure from the outside. 
Das Jahr 2005 ist entscheidend für Kirgistans politische Zukunft. Die Wahlen für das 
Parlament Ende Februar und mehr noch die Präsidentschaftswahl im Oktober bieten dem 
Land die Gelegenheit, den ersten demokratischen Machtwechsel in Zentralasien zu 
vollziehen: Der amtierende Präsident, Askar Akaev, hat mehrmals verkündet, er werde sich 
an die Verfassung halten und zurücktreten. Falls er in Missachtung seiner eigenen 
Versprechen doch im Amt bleiben und es zu groben Wahlfälschungen kommen sollte, 
besteht die Gefahr von politischen Unruhen, welche sich auf andere Themenbereiche 
ausdehnen könnten. Das Völkergemisch und Erfahrungen mit interethnischen Konflikten 
stellen eine gewisse Gefahr dar für ethnisch motivierte Gewalt. Dies würde aber eine 
verantwortungslose Instrumentalisierung von Ethnizität durch politische Akteure für ihre 
eigenen Zwecke bedingen. Die erfolgreiche Privatisierung von Landwirtschaftsland zeigt 
aber, dass mögliche Gefahren mit genügend politischem Willen und nötigenfalls Druck von 
aussen auch beseitigt werden können. 
Pour l’avenir politique du Kirghizistan, l’année 2005 est décisive. Les élections 
parlementaires à la fin de février ainsi que les élections présidentielles en octobre offrent la 
possibilité du premier changement démocratique de gouvernement en Asie Centrale: le 
Président actuel, Askar Akaev, a promis plusieurs fois qu’il ne se représenterait pas pour un 
nouveau mandat, comme l’exige la constitution du pays. S’il se représentait quand-même, 
malgré ses promesses, et en cas de massives manipulations électorales, des troubles  
politiques ne peuvent pas être exclus. Il y a même un certain risque que des dimensions 
autres que politiques puissent être touchées. La diversité ethnique et les conflits inter-
ethniques du passé représentent un risque d’éruption d’actes de violence à caractère 
ethnique, si le facteur ethnique devait être exploité par des agents politiques 
irresponsables, dans l’intérêt de leurs visées personnelles. Cependant, comme l’a prouvé la 
privatisation réussie de la terre agricole, il est possible d’éliminer les dangers potentiels 
avec de la volonté politique et, si nécessaire, par la pression extérieure.  
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______________________ 
1 Preface 
The present report is part of a series of working papers published by FAST International, the 
Early Warning Program of swisspeace. In this context we would like to point out briefly the 
focus and main aim of this paper. 
FAST’s core task is the early warning of violent conflict with the aim of linking it to early 
action or response in order to prevent crises situations from deteriorating. Linked to that, 
FAST also looks at identifying “windows of opportunity” for the purpose of peace-building. 
Several tools are applied in the combined methodology used by FAST, in order to analyze 
developments in the countries of concern. The core issues that influence the development 
of the country are analyzed by looking at root and proximate causes, as well as intervening 
factors. This Country Risk Profile is, thus, the continuation of this task, providing an in-
depth study of Kyrgyzstan by looking closely at several selected core issues that shape the 
degree of conflictivity. 
The underlying tool for this analysis is the Analytical Framework,1 which points out the 
single factors building up to the outbreak of a conflict and/or influencing a conflictive 
situation. By applying this tool, the analysts of FAST are continuously updating the status of 
developments in the countries monitored. The Analytical Framework, hence, provides an 
up-to-date set of the key issues critical for the further development of the country. 
Since FAST strives to link early warning with early action, the last chapter of this paper will 
place strong emphasis on discussing strategic options. These options are directed at end-
users of FAST products and shall hopefully be incorporated into their ongoing decision 
making process. 
We hope that this paper will provide the reader with food for thought on the further 
developments and the necessary steps to take in order to resolve current problems and 
crises in Kyrgyzstan by peaceful means.  
 
1 For further information on the Analytical Framework and the definition of root causes, proximate causes and 
intervening factors please see http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/analytical.htm, see document “Background 
information on FAST`s Analytical Framework.” 
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2 Introduction 
The FAST Country Risk Profile Kyrgyzstan will discuss in detail the following issues: the 
cleavage between the government and the opposition, privatization of agricultural land, 
and the complex of topics comprising ethnicity, regionalism, borders, and the interactions 
thereof. The author is well aware that the conflict potential for Kyrgyzstan cannot be 
entirely covered by these three issues only – there are arguably many other issues that one 
has to consider for an overall assessment. Topics such as corruption, religious extremism, or 
economic inequality are not covered in-depth in this paper but may or may not be touched 
upon within the scope of the three issues. For an overview of other relevant topics please 
see the FAST Analytical Framework in the Appendix. 
The reasons for having chosen the three above mentioned issues are the following: 
On the political scene, 2005 is a key year for Kyrgyzstan’s history. Despite many 
shortcomings and a negative trend since the second half of the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan still has 
the most liberal political system in Central Asia, and there is a real chance for the first 
peaceful “change of guards“ in the region: President Akaev is the first president in a highly 
autocratic environment who has publicly stated that he will leave his post in 2005. This is 
all the more significant if one considers the concentration of political power with the 
presidency and the neighboring countries “leaders’“ artificial extension of their term of 
office and, consequently, their hold on power. However, certain activist groups in 
Kyrgyzstan do not believe in the President keeping his word and deeply distrust the 
authorities. International observation missions for the parliamentary and presidential 
elections should therefore guard against election fraud. In case of electoral fraud political 
turmoil cannot be ruled out. Recent events in Ukraine with its so called “Orange 
Revolution“ have shifted the focus of international attention towards Kyrgyzstan, and many 
an analyst points to the possibility of a so-called domino-theory, arguing that after Georgia 
and Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan will be the next candidate for democratization by a whatever 
colored revolution. This paper does not want to nourish such speculations but aims at 
providing the reader with a concise analysis of the political system and the possible 
scenarios and their impact on the conflict situation in the country. 
The second issue, the privatization of agricultural land, has been chosen in order to set 
some kind of counterpoint to the ever-present pessimistic scenarios on Central Asia in 
general and Kyrgyzstan in particular: Despite an enormous potential for conflict (which will 
be discussed later on), the privatization of agricultural land has been a success story, 
without any of the fears voiced on the eve of privatization having materialized. This chapter 
will show that the huge problems the country is facing notwithstanding, change towards 
the better is possible. 
A Silk Road to Democracy? FAST Country Risk Profile Kyrgyzstan 
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Deeply intertwined with the political processes and land privatization are ethnic, regional, 
and border issues: The only cases of political violence Kyrgyzstan has seen so far are either 
on political-regional or resource-ethnic grounds.2 Therefore a thorough assessment of both 
of these factors is vital. Ethnic diversity, scarcity of agricultural land, and unclear borders 
pose, if exploited, a remarkable threat to both Kyrgyzstan’s stability and its sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, as will be shown later on, talk of any “Balkanization“ of Central Asia is highly 
risky and could easily turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
2  Noteworthy are the bloody Özgön and Osh riots in 1990 over the allocation of land, housing, and rumors on 
ethnic criteria, as well as the clashes between protesters and police in the southern district of Aksy in 2002 on 
political grounds. These events will be discussed later on. 
The Cleavage Between Government and Opposition 
 5
 
3 The Cleavage Between Government and 
Opposition 
3.1 Introduction 
The last fifteen years have seen the emergence of more than twenty newly independent 
states in the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, along 
with regime changes in several other countries in the region. Despite the huge differences 
between these countries, all faced similar challenges with regard to establishing a 
democratic, law-based political system. After the ouster of the old regimes and/or the 
obtaining of independence, many countries have seen a first period of turmoil, followed by 
the establishment of a certain set of political rules. In most of these countries, the first 
change of power after these new rules were imposed proved to be crucial for the further 
development, in as much as the political direction is determined. Several countries, 
however, have not yet seen any change of power, be such democratic or undemocratic in 
nature.3 Therefore, several questions remain unanswered in these countries: Do the 
different players abide by the rules set by the institutional framework that has been put in 
place? Is there a fair chance for “everyone“ to obtain his or her share of power? Will those 
who lose the battle accept that they have not lost the war, that there is a fair chance to win 
next time? 
If Kyrgyzstan succeeded in a peaceful and “democratic“ change of power at the highest 
level, it would be the first country in Central Asia to achieve this, a fact that should not be 
underestimated by different international actors active in the region. Thanks to such a 
development, Kyrgyzstan could regain its reputation as an “Island of Democracy.“ 
However, failing to provide for a peaceful and “democratic“ change of power would deeply 
impact the country’s stability, mainly from an economic point of view: The USA, the main 
bilateral donor and a major contributor to international organizations’ aid programs, stated 
publicly (AFP, 17 July 2004; Kyrgyzinfo, 13 October 2004) that they expect a new regime. 
Therefore, it is highly probable that a prolonged government of the incumbent President, 
Askar Akaev, would not only face an image problem but also economic troubles. This, in 
turn, could lead to social unrest in the country, caused by the widened gap between the 
thin but extremely rich elite and the common people. 
As Kyrgyzstan will be holding parliamentary elections in the spring of 2005 and presidential 
elections in fall 2005, it is possible that the confrontations between the government and 
the opposition will increase. Not only the scandal on bugging-devices found in the offices 
of opposition members of parliament in January 2004, but also the re-grouping of several 
opposition parties during 2004 are among the possible tensions the country might face in 
the election run-ups, especially in the light of the bloody Aksy shootings of April 2002 (see 
chapter 3.3.). The cleavage between the government and the opposition demands special 
attention from the viewpoint of early warning. This section therefore aims at answering 
questions such as the following: Who will be challenging whom? By what means? On the 
basis of which arguments? What are the perspectives of success for the different parties? 
  
 
______________________ 
3  These countries are: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In these four countries, it is still 
the old nomenklatura that has been ruling the country since Soviet times. 
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And, last but not least, which are the options to be chosen by the country as well as by the 
international community in order to keep the political disputes and conflicts on a peaceful, 
non-violent level? 
In order to discuss and analyze the above mentioned topic, this paper will be divided into 
the following chapters: 
1. Definitions 
2. Historical Review (beginning with the country’s independence) 
3. Description of the political system and the different players 
4. Outlook 
 
3.2 Definitions 
In order to ensure a clear discussion in the following chapter, certain definitions must be 
made. Although the title suggests that there are two blocks – the government and the 
opposition – neither of them can be described as being homogeneous: The government in 
the proper sense of the word, actually only includes the Prime Minister and his “staff,“ the 
different ministers. However, when the government is referred to in this paper, the author 
also includes the presidency, i.e. the President who holds the most significant political 
power. Within the governmental block, the President’s “family“ is also a very important 
element – all family members hold stakes with regard to economic or political power, 
which makes them influential in different ways. Their interests may well differ from those 
of government members who do not belong to the “family.“ According to many ordinary 
Kyrgyz, it is the “family“ that holds most of the power in the country.4 In order to be clear 
in the analysis below, the author will distinguish and specify the actors accordingly. The 
general term “government“ will be used if the entire governmental camp is concerned; 
when further differentiation is appropriate, such will be made. 
Matters are at least as complicated with regard to the term “the opposition.“ From a 
Western perspective, “opposition“ is understood as being those parties not currently in 
power and having an alternative political agenda. For Kyrgyzstan, this definition does not 
all that appropriate, because many of the most outspoken critics of the current government 
are not exponents of political parties, but rather NGO activists working for human and civil 
rights. All these organizations – be it NGOs or political parties – are mainly person-
centered, expressing the needs and viewpoints of their leaders rather than those of a 
certain segment of the population.5 Since many of the NGOs are either completely or at 
least partially Western-funded, a large part of the population perceives them as not being 
very positive; statements such as “They are only working for their own interests” or  
 
4 Interviews in Bishkek, Talas, Naryn and Osh, April 2004. 
5  International Crisis Group 2004: Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects. Osh/Brussels (11 
August). This view has been confirmed by interviews with international and local experts as well as the 
author’s personal observation. 
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“They’d better start working like ordinary people do instead of sitting in their offices and 
receiving foreign money” are common.6 There can be no doubt that many NGOs do make a 
difference: However, such NGOs are mainly organizations working on a grassroots level, 
addressing needs that are of immediate concern to the target group.7  
 
3.3 Historical Overview 
Kyrgyzstan gained its independence in 1991 with the break up of the Soviet Union. As 
Kyrgyzstan is a mixed presidential-parliamentarian political system,8 the main focus of 
interest lies on the presidency, albeit in its interaction with the people, the parliament, and 
the constitution.  
The country’s first President, Askar Akaev, was elected back in 1990 by the Kyrgyz Supreme 
Soviet. After the failed coup d’état against Gorbachev in Moscow, the Kyrgyz Supreme 
Soviet voted for Kyrgyzstan’s independence on 31 August 1991. In October 1991, the 
Kyrgyz people elected Akaev as their President. The country adopted its first constitution in 
1993 and the ruling principles of statehood were outlined as follows:  
The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) shall be a sovereign, unitary, democratic 
Republic, and it shall be founded as a rule-of-law and secular state.9
According to his supporters, in December 1995, Akaev was “re-elected“ President for the 
first term, as it was his first election under the constitution of independent Kyrgyzstan. This 
distinction became all the more important in the run-up to the presidential elections in 
2000: While his opponents insisted on him having served the constitutionally allowed two 
terms, Akaev himself, together with his supporters, referred to the adoption of the 
constitution of 1993 (with constitutional referenda in 1996, 1998, 2001, 2003), which 
meant that the 2000 election would be the second election under the country’s 
constitution. Akaev won this election fairly unopposed, although the OSCE observer 
mission stated that:  
[…] the 29 October 2000 presidential election in the Kyrgyz Republic, despite 
some positive features, failed to comply with OSCE commitments for 
democratic elections […]10
However, the main failures were not to be found on the election day but in the run-up to 
the elections, with candidates being harassed (leading from intimidation, barring from 
 
 
______________________ 
6  Interviews in Bishkek, Yssyk Köl and Jalalabad, April 2004. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Merkel, Wolfgang 1999: Systemtransformation. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. 446. 
9  Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic May 1993, in its latest version of February 2003. Unofficial translation. 
10  OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 2001: Kyrgyz Republic. Presidential 
Elections October 29, 2000. OSCE/ODIHR Final Report. Warsaw: ODIHR (15 January). 1. 
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running, to lengthy jail sentences for the possibly most threatening opponent, Feliks Kulov), 
biased (state) media coverage and irregularities during the tabulation process.11  
Possibly, the most significant challenge that the young republic has faced with regard to 
the cleavage between the opposition and the government to date is what is referred to as 
the Aksy Events of 2002, when police opened fire on a crowd of more than 1,000 
demonstrators peacefully protesting oppositional parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov’s 
arrest for alleged abuse of power. Six people were killed, and Beknazarov was released. 
This event shocked the Kyrgyz population, because it was the first time since the bloody 
clashes in Osh in 1990, that political disputes led to bloodshed. In the aftermath, there 
were several protest demonstrations in different parts of the country, including the capital 
Bishkek, where people demanded that these events be investigated and that the 
responsible persons be punished. President Akaev thereupon introduced certain conciliatory 
steps, e.g. reshuffling his government (Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev was dismissed) 
and appointing a joint Constitutional Council by the government and the civil society 
(political parties and NGOs) that was to work out recommendations for a constitutional 
reform to be approved of by the voters in a nationwide referendum. However, parallel to 
the Constitutional Council, the President appointed a working group of legal advisers 
selected by himself. Within a month’s time (January 2003) the new constitution had been 
worked out and approved of by the people (with an approval rate of over 75 percent). The 
two questions that were asked at the referendum were as follows: 
1. Should the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On a New Version of the Constitution 
of the Kyrgyz Republic” be adopted? 
2. Should Askar Akaev remain President of the Kyrgyz Republic until December 
2005 (until the end of his constitutional term) in order to implement the 
approved constitutional amendments?12 
The international community mainly criticized the short notice given rather than the 
referendum's actual content – the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) declined the invitation to observe the referendum due to the short notice. 
Whether the amendments as such will have a positive or negative impact on political and 
social life in Kyrgyzstan remains open to discussion: Some points of the constitution aim at 
strengthening democratic principles and human and civil rights, others (especially the 
extended competences of the President) leave room for interpretation on the limitations of 
government activity. 
 
11  Ibid. 
12  OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 2003: Kyrgyz Republic. Constitutional  
Referendum, February 2, 2003. Political Assessment Report. Warsaw: ODIHR (20 March). 
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3.4 The Political System 
German political scientist Wolfgang Merkel (1999: 446) described the political system of 
the Kyrgyz Republic as a mixed system, situated between parliamentary and presidential 
systems. However, there is reason to argue that since then, there has been a steady move 
towards a more accentuated presidential system, especially if the political system is 
analyzed according to the distinguishing features established by Dutch political scientist 
Arend Lijphart (1999). According to Lijphart, three main features determine whether a 
political system can be referred to as presidential or parliamentarian: 
 Presidential Parliamentarian 
Position of the executive power Head of government: President, 
elected for a certain period 
defined by the constitution 
Head of government: Elected Prime 
Minister or Minister President, 
dependant on support by the 
parliament during the period in office; 
can be overthrown by vote of no 
confidence 
Election of the executive power Directly or indirectly by the 
electorate 
By the legislative body 
Character of the executive power Advisory body to the President Collegial or collective, with a head of 
government more or less powerful 
 
The political system of the Kyrgyz Republic is characterized by a very strong position of the 
President and can therefore be described as presidential, according to Lijphart. Regarding 
the first feature, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic cannot be overthrown by a vote of no 
confidence. Therefore, he does not require the support of the parliament with regard to his 
term in office.13 The fact that the President is elected by the people clearly points to a 
presidential system, as do the methods of appointment and work of the Kyrgyz 
government. 
 
3.4.1 Presidency 
The President of the Kyrgyz Republic is not only the Head of State (art. 42, paragraph 1 of 
the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, May 1993, in its latest version of February 2003; 
unofficial translation), he also has far-reaching legislative powers. The President can 
propose bills to the parliament and oppose bills adopted by the parliament. However, after 
two consecutive votes with a majority of two thirds in the first vote and three quarters in 
  
 
______________________ 
13  There is a provision for impeachment of the President in the constitution (art. 51), but the rules are very  
strict and apply only to “treason or other serious offense” (art. 51, paragraph 1). 
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the second vote, the parliament can insist on a bill being adopted. With regard to his 
government, the President has even more far-reaching competences: If the parliament 
rejects his proposed Prime Minister candidate three times but the President still insists, the 
President has the freedom to appoint the Prime Minister and dissolve the parliament (art 
71, paragraph 4 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, May 1993, in its latest version 
of February 2003; unofficial translation). The President’s power in the judiciary branch is 
just as extensive, since he has the right to nominate candidates for the position of judges 
for the Constitutional Court and Procurator-General (for selection by the parliament). In a 
centralized state such as Kyrgyzstan, it is not surprising that the President is also 
responsible for nominating the governors and judges of the provinces. 
Given the above mentioned presidential powers, it is obvious that in Kyrgyz politics, the 
presidency is the “big prize,“ all the more so if you also take into account the informal 
power of the President and his family.14 Therefore, the main focus of contention is the 
presidency, with the parliamentary elections (to be held in February 2005) being of lesser 
significance. The parliamentary elections are seen as a preparatory act to the presidential 
elections with regard to transparency and support for the opposition and governmental 
camps. 
 
3.4.2 Parliament 
After a period of fierce battles between the legislative and executive branches in the early 
nineties, the power struggle was eventually decided in favor of the executive branch. The 
last parliamentary elections in 2000 marked the beginning of a period of deteriorating 
democratic standards. For the first time, the government had a strong opponent with the 
potential to threaten the President's grip on power: Feliks Kulov, the leader of the 
oppositional Ar-Namys party, former mayor of Bishkek and former security chief of 
Kyrgyzstan. Of the six parties commonly referred to as oppositional, three were either 
denied registration or de-registered on legally disputable grounds; these three are: Ar-
Namys, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, and the People’s Party.15 The same 
happened to certain individual candidates. The OSCE observer mission stated that 
The overwhelming conclusion is that there was a high level of political 
interference affecting actions and decisions of candidates, election commissions 
and courts, up to and including the CEC and Supreme Court. These actions 
aimed at excluding particular political forces from competing in the election.16
14  This informal power is probably one of the main “temptations“ for the incumbent President to stay in 
power, not least because of the economic advantages for his family (in a wider sense). Without entering into 
greater detail, it is most obvious that in a country with a country rank of 122 for Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index 2004, defining corruption “as the abuse of public office for 
private gain.” (http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004_faq.en.html#two), the highest official and his 
entourage cannot be free from corruption. 
15  OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 2000: Kyrgyz Republic. Parliamentary 
Elections. February 20 & March 12, 2000. Final Report. Warsaw: ODIHR (10 April). 21. 
16  Ibid: 9. 
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Tension was especially high during the time of Feliks Kulov’s alleged defeat in the second 
round and his subsequent arrest on charges dating back to when he was Head of National 
Security and Governor of Chui Oblast. 
However, despite several blatant irregularities in the 2000 elections, there are some 
outspoken opposition politicians in the Kyrgyz parliament. With the change from a 
bicameral to a unicameral parliament coming into effect for the 2005 elections, the 
competition between candidates will become increasingly stronger, especially in the South. 
Since people there are more likely to elect politicians whom they trust to ensure direct 
benefits for their region, it is likely that many of the legislators will originate from 
influential families with considerable means.17
In an environment with fluctuating party and coalition affiliations, the listing of all the 
different parties is neither an easy nor a fruitful task. Some parties and coalitions in both 
the governmental and the oppositional camp, however, deserve a closer look due to their 
specific significance for the political process. 
The most recent and interesting phenomenon on the pro-governmental side is the party 
Alga, Kyrgyzstan!. While traveling around the country in April 2004, the author noticed 
many banners praising the party, the name of which means Go ahead, Kyrgyzstan! 
Although not officially, and unlike Asar in Kazakhstan, the informal leader of Alga, 
Kyrgyzstan! is President Akaev’s daughter Bermet. The image Alga, Kyrgyzstan! is that of a 
young, dynamic, liberal party that is attractive for students and wealthy businessmen 
alike.18 The similarities with Russia’s ruling Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia) party are 
obvious, i.e. a strong party, established with the aid of administrative resources and a party 
that should be able to win in the parliamentary elections, thus fully supporting the current 
regime and providing its actions with a superficially legal basis. Party members do not shy 
away from populist measures, i.e. the call for the introduction of dual citizenship with the 
Russian Federation in January 2005 in order to win the votes of the Russian-speaking 
population. A victory of Alga, Kyrgyzstan! at the parliamentary elections would allow the 
government to modify the constitution and continue its rule (see chapter 3.6). 
 
______________________ 
17  Interview in Bishkek, April 2004. The validity of this argument for the whole country, though, has been 
verified by the results of the October 2004 local elections, where more than 70 percent of the seats went to 
individual businessmen. (Hamid Toursunof 2004: Kyrgyzstan: The Rumbles from Ukraine. Prague: Transition 
Online (13 December). 
18  The promotion of Bermet Akaeva’s candidacy for parliament by a student group at the Kyrgyz State National 
University in the beginning of January 2005 gives evidence for this tactics. 
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3.5 The Oppositional Camp – Fragmentation, Volatility and 
Irreconcilability 
 
3.5.1 NGOs – ”barking dogs” or a real political force? 
As stated above, political opposition in Kyrgyzstan does not manifest itself in a clear 
political alternative to the agenda of the incumbent government. Many of the oppositional 
movements are organized around prominent figures and act as a platform to their personal 
interests, be they political or economic in nature. There are no real strategies for the 
development of the country, since the main goal is to do away with the current regime. A 
very important main distinction of the different movements opposing the incumbent 
government is the distinction between political parties and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). The phenomenon of politicized NGOs is closely linked to the 
weakness of the political parties: while certain NGOs receive foreign funding, political 
parties are usually neglected by international donors. This, together with a general lack of 
“oppositional culture,“19 keeps oppositional parties weak, while NGOs try to assume the 
parties’ role. Thus, many representatives of “civil society” leave the original field of a 
neutral approach to the analysis of their respective field of research (e.g. corruption, human 
rights, press freedom, etc.) and become advocacy groups for a regime change. This leads to 
a misperception of “civil society,“ since the difference in the roles of political parties and 
NGOs becomes blurred and weakens both. Moreover, this ambiguity of roles in society can 
be exploited by the authorities, for instance by pointing to the foreign financial sources of 
certain NGOs. 
There can be no doubt, however, that NGOs do play a very important role in the socio-
political concert of Kyrgyzstan – the role of a clear and neutral analysis of the state in their 
respective research field: When human rights are abused, the role of an independent NGO 
specialized in the area cannot be overestimated; it is such organizations that can ring the 
alarm bell and provide victims with assistance. The step from this task to the call for 
political consequences, such as a resignation of the responsible persons, is a small but 
delicate one, and should therefore be left to the oppositional parties. 
 
3.5.2 Parliament 
At the last parliamentary elections in 2000, together, all parties with opposition orientation 
won 11 seats out of 105; whereas parties with presidential orientation won 21 seats. 
Taking into consideration the fact that “independent candidates“ won 73 out of 105 seats 
at the last parliamentary elections, the role of political parties becomes even clearer.20
 
19  Interview in Bishkek, April 2004. 
20  Ibid. 
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For the upcoming parliamentary elections, the spectrum of parties and election blocks is 
very wide and volatile, especially on the opposition side. Within the scope of this report, it 
is only possible to cover a small range of the oppositional forces, thereby attempting to 
focus on the most important ones. 
The Communist Party 
Historically, there was one single party, i.e. the Communist Party. After seventy years of 
exclusive ruling, the Communists lost their power in the wake of Kyrgyzstan’s 
independence. When Akaev, the only Central Asian leader who was not previously head of 
the local Communist Party, was installed as a compromise President by the last Kyrgyz 
Supreme Soviet in 1990, the Communist Party lost its predominant position in Kyrgyz 
politics. Unlike the situation in other former Soviet republics, however, the Communist 
Party was not completely banned. It has remained the strongest and most well organized 
opposition party in the country, a status it owes mainly to its organizational structures 
inherited from Soviet times as well as a certain “nostalgia“ for the Soviet past among large 
parts of the population. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the Communist Party of 
Kyrgyzstan won six seats (out of a total of 105 seats). With regard to its parliamentary 
representation, the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan must be considered the most important 
opposition party in the country. With the demise of its leader, Absamat Masaliev in August 
2004, the Communists lost a leader figure. However, since the political landscape is not 
organized according to Western standards of democracy, the strongest representation in 
parliament does not necessarily reflect a party’s true strength in the population.  
Ar Namys 
When screening the international press on Kyrgyzstan’s political scene, the seemingly most 
important opposition force is the Ar Namys Party headed by the jailed party leader and 
former mayor of Bishkek, Feliks Kulov. However, in parliament, Ar Namys does not hold 
one of the seats distributed according to the party lists.21
Electoral Blocks 
In addition to the two main opposition parties, there are (for the time being) four 
opposition blocks, i.e. For Fair Elections, the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, Jangy 
Bagyt, and Atajurt. The interesting common characteristic of these four movements is that 
they are all headed by persons formerly employed by the authorities: The People’s 
Movement of Kyrgyzstan is led by former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev, Atajurt by 
Roza Otunbaeva, a former Foreign Minister and Ambassador, Jangy Bagyt by former 
Foreign Minister Muratbek Imanaliev, and For Fair Elections by the former Chairman of the 
Security Council and close friend of Akaev, Misir Ashirkulov. The only official candidate for 
  
 
______________________ 
21  OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 2000: Kyrgyz Republic. Parliamentary 
Elections. February 20, & March 12, 2000. Final Report. Warsaw: ODIHR (10 April). 21. 
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presidency to date is Kurmanbek Bakiev.22 However, the volatility of these oppositional 
electoral blocks is best illustrated by the following example: In May 2004, the Union for
Fair Elections included prominent opposition figures Omurbek Tekebaev, the leader of the 
Ata-Meken Socialist Party and presidential candidate in 2000, as well as Adakhan 
Madumarov, an opposition parliamentarian and outspoken critic of the President.23 In 
December 2004,they both changed their affiliation and joined Atajurt.24 Therefore, it is very 
difficult to provide an accurate picture of the state of the Kyrgyz opposition. 
The fact that the main opposition figures were once part of the administration could 
hamper their chances at the elections to a certain degree – the perception of the opposition 
as being part of and fed by the regime is widespread.25 The high number of formal and 
informal deals between opposition figures and the government also points in this 
direction.26 Consequently, criticism of the current regime does not necessarily correlate with 
broad support for oppositional NGOs or parties. 
 
3.5.3 Presidency 
For many observers, Feliks Kulov is still the candidate with the best chances of winning the 
presidency in free and fair elections: the only obstacle are the criminal charges against him 
(see chapter 3.4.2.). However, since Kulov is still one of the most influential political figures 
in Kyrgyzstan, he has the ability to unite the opposition, even from jail.27 The question is 
whether he actually wishes to do so. Two perspectives seem possible at the moment: First, 
Kulov will not attempt to unite the opposition, since the victory of another oppositional 
candidate could seriously hamper Kulov’s own chances of becoming President after his 
release. With the successor to the incumbent President being a member of the apparatus, 
Kulov could maintain his image as that of a political martyr. Second, Kulov will try to unite 
the opposition. If the opposition candidate wins the election, the chances are high that 
Kulov’s case will be reviewed again and he will be released. Then the new President could 
reward him for his support by appointing him Prime Minister. 
As mentioned above, the only official candidate for presidency is former Prime Minister 
Kurmanbek Bakiev. His ouster from government was caused (at least officially) by the 
bloody Aksy events in 2002 (see chapter 3.3.), and the question as to which point his role 
in this could hamper his chances to be elected must remain open. For the opposition, 
however, it is important to unite behind one single candidate, since fragmentation would 
only help the candidate favored by the incumbent government. 
22  Hamid Toursunof 2004: Kyrgyzstan: The Rumbles from Ukraine. Prague: Transition Online (13 December). 
23  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 May 2004. 
24  Ibid., 14 December 2004. 
25  Interviews in Bishkek, Talas, Jalalabad, Osh, Batken, Naryn and Yssyk Köl provinces, April 2004. 
26  International Crisis Group 2004: Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects. Osh/Brussels (11 
August). 
27  RFE-RL, 12 January 2005. 
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3.6 Outlook 
The most crucial question is whether or not incumbent President Akaev will really step 
down in 2005 and allow for a democratic change of power. His statements on this subject 
point univocally to an end of the Akaev era. However, many opposition groups fear the 
President might not keep his word and may resort to various mechanisms in order to at 
least indirectly retain his grip on power. This chapter shows possible future development 
scenarios, as described by interlocutors in April 2004 as well as possible consequences of 
such scenarios.  
Scenario 1: Akaev remains in power as President 
In breach of all the promises he made to the international community and to his people, 
Askar Akaev will seek a third, that is to say fourth (re. above), term in office. In order to 
ensure at least a cosmetic legitimacy, the President will need to convince the parliament to 
modify the constitution. The prerequisite for this would be positive results in the 
parliamentary elections for the pro-presidential powers. Another possibility would be a 
referendum on constitutional changes. The incumbent President would surely win such a 
referendum, since he has all the administrative resources to achieve the result desired. The 
worst case scenario leading to Akaev serving another term in office would be the 
provocation of internal or external instability by the authorities in order to call for a state of 
emergency and the subsequent usurpation of power by the ruling elite.28 To date, however, 
there are no signs for such a move, although the President did make hints regarding a 
certain degree of radicalization of the authorities.29
Scenario 2: Akaev steps down but changes the political system in his favor 
After a victory of pro-Akaev powers in parliament, the President will ask legislature to 
adopt changes to the political system, i.e. the switch from a presidential to a 
parliamentarian system in which the President would have mere representative functions 
and a Prime Minister appointed by the parliament would hold the effective power. Thanks 
to his supporters in parliament, Akaev would be elected Prime Minister after his resignation 
from the presidency. A twist on this scenario would involve the President stepping down 
but “recommending“ a Prime Minister from among his closest entourage, possibly even a 
family member.  
Scenario 3: Akaev steps down and appoints a successor 
This is the “Russian scenario,“ referring to the transition of power from the first Russian 
President, Boris Yeltsin, to his successor, Vladimir Putin. In this scenario, Akaev will look for 
a reliable person to propose as his successor. The deal will then involve the incumbent 
President providing his successor with all the means necessary in order to win the pro 
  
 
______________________ 
28  International Crisis Group 2004: Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects. Osh/Brussels (12 
August). 
29  Beshimov, Erdin 2004: Kyrgyzstan’s Akaev: The Revolution Stops Here. Eurasianet (22 December). 
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forma democratic elections while the latter will guarantee Akaev and his family exemption 
from punishment for crimes committed during Akaev's time in office. A variation of this 
scenario would involve the appointment of a family member as his successor, a step that 
would significantly decrease the danger of being persecuted. 
Scenario 4: Akaev steps down and allows a democratic transition 
The President will keep his word and step down without any major interference in the 
succession process. This could allow for a free and fair competition for votes on the 
grounds of the different political programs of different candidates. 
Possible consequences 
If President Akaev stays in power at whatever cost (constitutional changes, electoral fraud, 
state of emergency) the mid- and long-term consequences for the country’s future would be 
bleak both internationally and domestically: Domestically, it is possible that people will 
become fed up with election fraud and attempt to oust the illegitimately elected President 
or Prime-Minister, i.e. Akaev. This could be brought about by peaceful means, depending 
on the loyalty of the security forces that is difficult to predict in the case of massive turmoil. 
However, it is also possible that the people would accept a new term for Akaev without 
any major opposition. Oppositional forces would be sure to cry foul, but the cry would 
remain unheard in the country. The country has no significant natural resources and 
depends greatly on foreign aid. Its external debt amounts to 115 percent of its GDP and 
discussions with the Paris Club regarding restructuring in view of debt payment have been 
postponed until after the February 2005 parliamentary elections.30 Most of the foreign aid 
to Kyrgyzstan was provided on the basis of its reputation as an “Island of Democracy.“ This 
goodwill will most probably deteriorate, should Akaev, contrary to his promises, stay in 
power. Without international goodwill (and aid), economic hardship would very likely 
increase. This, in turn, could lead to widespread public discontent and to a destabilization 
of the country as a whole.  
Most probably, the international community would react with goodwill to a “Russian 
variant“ involving the appointment and election of a successor - provided the election 
process does not fall short of international standards. This statement is based on the 
experience of the Russian Federation, where the 2000 presidential elections did not give 
rise to any special concern among the members of the international community. The only 
restriction necessary is the different geopolitical weight of Kyrgyzstan and the Russian 
Federation: Whether acquiescence with the “Russian variant“ in the Russian Federation 
was due to general satisfaction or to geopolitical reasoning and how the latter could 
influence the reaction to the same pattern in Kyrgyzstan is an issue that remains open. 
Domestically, there is no reason to assume any major disturbances. 
 
 
30  International Crisis Group 2004: Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects. Osh/Brussels (11 
August). 
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To date, the underlying assumption has been that the best solution for the country would 
be if President Akaev left office, since this, once more, would distinguish Kyrgyzstan from 
its more authoritarian neighbors. However, the question has to be asked whether a change 
of power would be the best solution for the country. Is there a viable alternative to the 
incumbent President? Or will a change of guards in the White House in Bishkek bear the 
risk of destabilization, despite correct procedures? When asking these questions, analysts 
have to be careful to avoid playing into the authorities’ hands, since many of the Central 
Asian rulers are keen on portraying themselves as the only guarantors of stability. 
Nevertheless, questions regarding alternatives must be asked, because a transfer of power 
for the sake of the process as such cannot be the ultimate aim. 
In this context, it is worth mentioning that the current President enjoys quite high a degree 
of support among ethnic minorities, either for his stance on language issues or for his 
bilateral relations with (more powerful) neighbors.31 With numerous opposition leaders 
more nationalistic in their rhetoric than Akaev, the absence of any ethnically motivated 
opposition is not surprising.32 The recent move of the Kyrgyz parliament to endorse a 
resolution for the government to raise the question on the return of the Uzbek 
Shakhimardan exclave to Kyrgyzstan in bilateral negotiations has to be seen in the light of 
the incumbent government fearing the image of a “soft” negotiator, rather than being of 
any concrete significance. However, playing the nationalistic card in the Central Asian 
context involves great risk for everyone. Any international actor dealing with governments 
in this region of the world should be knowledgeable of this fact. 
The Ukrainian or the Tajik Scenario for Kyrgyzstan? 
The revolutionary events in Ukraine at the end of 2004 gave rise to the question of a 
possible repetition of this form of power change in other CIS countries. Presidents 
throughout Central Asia have criticized the manner in which the Ukrainian opposition came 
to power, warning their own opponents that there will not be any revolution of any “color“ 
in their country (alluding to the “Orange Revolution“). Kyrgyzstan’s President Akaev was 
one of the harshest critics of both the 2004 Ukrainian and the 2003 Georgian change of 
power, at one point even questioning Georgia’s sovereignty by hinting that President 
Saakashvili receives his salary from US financier George Soros.33 Paralleling the President’s 
statements on developments in other CIS countries, Foreign Minister A. Aitmatov warned 
of a “Tajik Scenario“ that could arise out of the wish to realize a “velvet“ revolution34  and 
newspapers published in-depth analysis of the Tajik civil war.35
 
______________________ 
31  Khamidov, Alisher 2004: Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbeks: A Safe Vote for the Government. Eurasianet (9 September); 
Toralieva, Gulnura 2005: Kyrgyz Minorities to Back Akaev Parties. Bishkek/London: Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting, Reporting Central Asia no. 349 (16 February). 
32  Ibid.; Interview with Kyrgyz opposition leader, October 2000. 
33  Radio Azattyk, 8 January 2005. 
34  Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 6 January 2005. 
35  Delo Nr., 12 January 2005. 
A Silk Road to Democracy? FAST Country Risk Profile Kyrgyzstan 
 18
 
The combination of these facts illustrates the degree of nervousness in the current 
government. However, for the time being, there seems to be no real danger of either a 
“Ukrainian“ or a “Tajik“ scenario: 
 1. The opposition is not as united as it was in Ukraine. 
 2. The opposition lacks a charismatic leader figure. 
 3. The opposition is not able to mobilize the masses. 
 4. The tragedy of the Tajik civil war is too present among the members of 
the government, the opposition, and the broader population. 
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4 Privatization of Agricultural Land 
4.1 Introduction 
The issue of land in the Kyrgyz Republic consists of at least four sub-issues, i.e. agricultural 
land, undeveloped land, urban land, and pasture land. Although every sub-issue provides a 
complex of problems, the focus of this chapter lies on agricultural land for the following 
reasons: 
1. The population living in rural areas makes up two thirds of the population; 
2. Between one and two thirds of Kyrgyzstan’s population depends on 
agriculture; 
3. Agriculture is the only sector that showed a positive average annual growth 
between 1992 and 2002 and accounts for almost forty percent of the GDP.36 
Therefore, the importance of agricultural land cannot be denied and the consequences of a 
major conflict over land would be disastrous for the country, as the Özgön riots in 1990 
have shown (see chapter 5.3.). In this second part of the FAST Country Risk Profile on 
Kyrgyzstan, the author will provide a short historical background, discuss some of the fears 
and hopes connected with land privatization, describe the privatization process and assess 
the current situation. The last part of the paper will provide an outlook. 
Kyrgyzstan with its seventy year old tradition of state-ownership over land has made 
comparatively strong progress in privatizing agricultural land. Despite widespread fears of 
inter-ethnic clashes at the beginning of the privatization process, the implementation has 
been smooth, with only minor allocation problems.37 However, there are sources of 
discontent, though unrelated to the privatization as such – in certain areas, the plots 
allocated do not provide families with enough income in order to survive. The government 
seems to have recognized this problem and encourages farmers to collaborate on the basis 
of cooperatives, i.e. to unite their efforts in all stages of production – from acquiring seeds, 
to running common vehicle parks, to coordinated marketing strategies. The important 
factor of this model (and the factor that distinguishes it from the former Soviet model of 
collective farms, what were referred to as "Kolkhoz") is that farmers unite their efforts on a 
voluntary basis and divide profits while keeping their own property. 
 
 
______________________ 
36  http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/kgz_aag.pdf; 
http://www.rdiland.org/OURWORK/OurWork_Kyrgyzstan.html; 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/genderstats/genderRpt.asp?rpt=labor&cty=KGZ,Kyrgyz%20Republic&hm=ho
me2; Bloch, Peter C. and Rasmussen, Kathryn: Land Reform in Kyrgyzstan. In: Wegren, Stephen K. (ed.): 
Land Reform in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. London 1998. 
37  Interview in Suzak, April 2004. The main problem was the failure to raise an inventory at the Kolkhozes and 
Sovkhozes, which lead to some disputes over equipment. In the Suzak Raion of Jalalabat province, there 
have been problems with registration, because people had been living in the cities during the privatization 
process and then returned when the land had already been distributed. 
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4.2 The Concept of Land in the Soviet Era 
During the Soviet era, according to Marxist-Leninist ideology, land was a common good 
which belonged to and should be “owned” by the people. Therefore, owning land as 
private property was prohibited, except for very small gardens where farmers were allowed 
to practice subsistence farming. The main agricultural production was concentrated in 
Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes, practicing collective production methods. This collective system, 
introduced by Stalin in the 1930s and implemented by means of forced collectivization, 
showed some positive results (e.g. higher agricultural output) for a certain period of time. 
However, because of he lack of long-term incentives for agricultural workers, the system 
proved to be highly inefficient. This is best demonstrated by the fact that, under Brezhnev, 
four percent of the USSR’s arable land were privately owned plots that produced approx. 
twenty-five percent of the country’s agricultural output.38 Despite the shortcomings on 
microeconomic level, the system of collective farming has remained very popular among 
agricultural workers. The main arguments in favor of the collective system were job 
security, regularity of wages, non-monetary benefits (e.g. collective holiday trips), and the 
“feeling of belonging.”39 Although caution is called for (because of the general tendency to 
“sugarcoat” the past), the difficulties today's farmers face (e.g. a lack of entrepreneurship, 
dependence on the state to solve problems caused by “the market,” the deplorable state of 
existing equipment, etc.) can be seen as a confirmation of the popularity of collective 
farming. Nonetheless, many – mainly young – private farmers greatly appreciate the 
possibility to work independently, to own land (to be granted land titles) and to have the 
freedom to select the range of products they cultivate.40
 
4.3 Fears on the Eve of Privatization 
The arguments stated above point out the importance of agricultural land as a means of 
existence. Therefore, it is obvious that fears existed in the period preceding the 
privatization process. The main fears by the rural population included: 
• Unjust distribution of land; 
• land being bought up by wealthy city dwellers; 
• discrimination on ethnic grounds; 
• sell-out of the homeland to foreigners.41 
The fear of unjust distribution was closely related to the high level of corruption: People in 
the right position (e.g. former Kolkhoz or Sovkhos chairmen) exercising a direct influence 
  
38  http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch33.htm, 7.1.04. 
39  Interviews in Talas, Yssyk Köl, Naryn and Jalalabat provinces, April 2004. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), internal documents. Bishkek 1999/2000. 
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on the distribution process were suspected of steering the land distribution process to their 
own benefit; whereas poor land workers would be left without their due share. 
Mistrust of city dwellers (as a form of the deep-rooted rural-urban cleavage) was the 
driving force behind the second fear: It was assumed that people who had made their 
(relative) fortune in the cities would buy farm land for investment reasons, thereby ousting 
local rural residents with limited financial resources. 
The ethnic component was probably the main fear preceding the privatization process, 
which even led to a moratorium of the process in 1999.42 It must be stated that this fear 
was not unjustified – the only but nonetheless very bloody violent event that Kyrgyzstan 
had experienced up until then were ethnic clashes in the Southern cities of Özgön and Osh, 
where disputes over land between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks were the triggering factor.43 The 
reason why disputes over scarce resources – be it land or water – in Central Asia can quite 
easily turn into ethnic conflict lies in the contradiction between sedentary and nomadic 
peoples in the region, that is to say Uzbeks and Tajiks on the one hand and Kazakhs and 
Kyrgyz on the other.44 Whereas Kyrgyz were traditionally involved in cattle-breeding, 
Uzbeks have a much longer tradition of cultivating land. Therefore, Uzbeks are usually 
more successful farmers than Kyrgyz.45 The chapter on Interethnic Relations will deal with 
this issue in greater detail. 
The fear of a sell-out of the homeland to foreigners is persistent in many countries. In 
several countries, there are restrictions regarding the selling of land to foreigners. 
Kyrgyzstan is no exception – article 5 of the Land Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, February 
2003, states that 
[...] the allocation and alienation of agricultural land to foreign citizens is not 
allowed. 46
Even if the land is correctly inherited by a foreigner, the foreigner must sell the land to a 
citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic within a year's time.47 The fear of a sell-out in Kyrgyzstan is 
therefore totally unfounded and can only be explained by the high level of corruption that 
also exists in the judiciary, a situation that might be exploited by wealthy foreign investors. 
  
 
______________________ 
42  Ibid. 
43  For details refer to: 
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=5&issue_id=269&article_id=3044
44  Although there is some dispute between Tajiks and Uzbeks on the former being sedentary and the latter 
being nomadic, it is widely recognized that both groups have a more sedentary tradition, as compared to 
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. 
45  This might be contested by Kyrgyz, but the underlying feeling of the Uzbeks being more successful can be 
found with almost any of the many prejudices against the Uzbeks, such as “The Bazaars are dominated by 
Uzbek traders,” “The Uzbeks are slier,” “The Uzbeks are also hospitable, but their hospitality is always 
profit-oriented” (statements by Kyrgyz made in different talks and interviews, September 1999-April 2004). 
Whether these prejudices are true or not cannot be the question will not be discussed in this paper – their 
simple existence is enough to cultivate resentments. 
46  Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic May 1993, in its latest version of February 2003. Unofficial translation. 
47  Article 37, paragraph 2 of the Land Code of the Kyrgyz Republic in its February 2003 version. 
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This, however, has not occurred to date and is unlikely to occur in the future, because the 
land has already been distributed. 
 
4.4 The Privatization Process 
The process of land privatization in Kyrgyzstan has undergone three stages: 
• 1992: merely land of insufficient quality was given to farmers and without a 
corresponding legal basis 
• 1996: the first laws and presidential decrees were issued 
• 1999: the privatization process is completed, most of the agricultural land 
allocated.48 
Together with the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, the legal basis for the privatization 
of agricultural land is – the Land Code of the Kyrgyz Republic in its latest version of 17 
February 2003.49 Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic states 
that: 
Land, minerals, air space, water, forest, flora and fauna, and all other natural 
resources shall be the property of the Kyrgyz Republic, and they shall be used as a 
basis for life and functioning of the People of Kyrgyzstan, and shall be under the 
special protection of the state.50
Apart from the ownership rights on the part of the state, paragraph 3 also states that the 
[...] land may also be owned privately, municipally and otherwise. Limits to and 
procedures for the execution of their rights by landowners and guarantees of the 
protection of such rights shall be ascertained by law. 
This division between the general principle that land is the property of the Kyrgyz Republic 
and the possibility of private ownership illustrates the sensitiveness of the issue: Not only 
the roughly seventy years of Soviet rule but also the nomadic traditions created this special 
relationship between the people and the land. Land – pasture or agricultural – forms the 
very basis of existence, which explains why the issue of land privatization was highly 
contested. 
 
 
48  Interview in Talas, April 2004; Bloch, Peter C. 2002: Kyrgyzstan. Almost Done, What Next? In: Problems of 
Post-Communism, vol. 49, no. 1, January/February. 53-62. 
49  http://www.cis-legal-reform.org/document.asp?id=6951
50  Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic May 1993, in its latest version of February 2003. Unofficial translation. 
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Since 1996, the process of land privatization has been moving forward rapidly.51 
Agricultural land has been distributed to the local residents, with equal shares for each 
person, the size of the plot depending on the total amount of agricultural land available in 
the respective “Raion“ or district.52 Therefore, the size of allocated land varies between 
different districts, from 0.0015 hectares in Batken Oblast (province) to 2.5 hectares in Chui 
Oblast.53 Although there is reason to believe that justice has prevailed on a local level, the 
country-wide perspective leaves a totally different impression: People living in the densely 
populated Southern areas of Kyrgyzstan received much less land than people living in the 
North. It comes as no surprise that as a result of the distribution pattern, today, a 
significant South-North migration prevails.54
 
4.5 Current Situation 
Most agricultural land has been privatized by today and the share of publicly owned land 
varies between different Ayil Ökmötü (village governments).55 By lending the publicly 
owned land to farmers, the village administration receives some income to spend on social 
needs. The amount, however, depends on the size of the agricultural land available for 
lending.56 Since none of the fears mentioned above proved to come true, the overall 
impression of the land privatization process is one of success. This holds true with regard to 
different aspects: On one hand, Kyrgyzstan is the most advanced country in land 
privatization within the CIS and therefore enjoys a pioneer position. On the other hand, the 
consequence with which land privatization is carried out is advantageous for the (overall) 
economy. This can be demonstrated by the two following examples:  
With regard to agricultural output and productivity, Kyrgyzstan is the only country of the 
former Soviet Union that has increased its crop production in the period from 1998 to2000, 
as compared to the period between 1989 and 1991. With regard to food production, 
Kyrgyzstan ranks third behind Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; with regard to livestock 
production, Kyrgyzstan ranks fourth behind Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia; 
regarding cereal yield in kilograms per hectare, Kyrgyzstan comes in second behind 
Uzbekistan.57 The leading group of countries in agricultural production within the CIS could 
not be more different: Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with a tightly controlled state 
agriculture on the one and Kyrgyzstan with the most advanced land privatization on the 
  
 
______________________ 
51  http://www.rdiland.org/OURWORK/OurWork_Kyrgyzstan.html
52  Interviews in Talas, Karakol, Naryn, Batken, Suzak, and Isfana, April 2004. 
53  Interviews in Bishkek and Batken, April 2004. 
54  Interviews in Talas and Bishkek, April 2004. 
55  In Batken raion, 98 percent of the agricultural land are private property (Interview in Batken, April 2004), 
phone interview to Talas, February 2005. 
56  Alymkulov, Emil and Kulatov, Marat: Local Government in the Kyrgyz Republic. In: Munteanu, Igor, and 
Popa, Victor (eds.) 2001: Developing New Rules in the Old Environment. Local Governments in Eastern 
Europe, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Budapest: Open Society Institute. 552. 
57  World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
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other hand. There are different interpretations of this phenomenon, but the most important 
is that agricultural output is highest under a) complete state control over land, and b) the 
most radical privatization of land. Countries that have stopped halfway in-between face the 
most significant problems.58
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Thanks to a farsighted policy defined in the second half of the nineties, based on the 
principle of justice and equality, the major fears that preceded the privatization process 
have not come true: The agricultural land was neither purchased by a few rich city dwellers 
or otherwise privileged persons (e.g. former chairmen of Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes), nor 
has there been any significant discrimination of buyers on ethnic grounds. This is not to say 
that agricultural land could not be a trigger for violent conflict in the near future. The 
contested issue, however, would certainly not be the privatization of land but rather its 
scarcity in the Southern provinces, which exerts pressure on farmers with regard to the 
generation of income. 
In addition to the indisputable achievements of the privatization policy as conducted by the 
Kyrgyz government, one factor that facilitated the process, as compared to other Central 
and Eastern European countries, is the lack of a tradition of land ownership: Whereas in 
countries such as Romania59 or Poland, private land property existed before forced 
collectivization, Kyrgyzstan did not (or at least to a lesser extent) face such a legacy. 
Therefore, there were fewer disputes over land ownership (and subsequent restitution) than 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Another issue of concern is the farmers’ lack of experience with the free market: Despite 
highly effective advisory programs, most of the farmers have yet to adopt a sense of 
entrepreneurship. This means that when the price for one product, e.g. potatoes, is high 
one year, most farmers will grow potatoes the next year, which will lead to a drastic 
increase in production of that product and subsequently, the disintegration of prices. This 
lack of entrepreneurship and the farmers' disappointment with “the market” leads to 
widespread discontent. This frustration is currently not directed against any specific target, 
but could, if exploited by a politician, bare substantial danger for escalation. Therefore, it is 
absolutely crucial that advisory projects continue to assist farmers in questions related to 
market issues. 
The farmer as an entrepreneur is one part of the system. In order to seize the full scope of 
the problem, the counter-part – the customer – must also be taken into consideration: The 
Kyrgyz agriculture is in desperate need of reliable selling markets outside its own small 
  
58  This is of course a speculative assumption, but it seems to be the most reasonable explanation for the 
rankings of the three countries. 
59  For the land privatization process in Romania, see Verdery, Katherine 2001: Inequality as temporal process. 
Property and time in Transylvania’s land restitution. Anthropological Theory Vol 1(3) London. 
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territory.60 With Kazakhstan also being a major producer of agricultural goods, Uzbekistan 
having a very restrictive tariff policy, and Tajikistan being a rather small market, the Kyrgyz 
agricultural sector faces huge difficulties in selling its products. One possible  solution that 
was mentioned quite often by interlocutors during the research carried out in April 2004 
was the establishment of food processing factories. However, the question of where to sell 
processed foods is not all that different from the question of where to sell unprocessed 
food. Diversification, combined with a niche strategy, might be a reasonable alternative to 
mass production of a few chosen products.61 Whether the question of demand can be 
solved in this manner remains to be seen, since the major obstacle for mutually benefiting 
trade in Central Asia is the restrictive tariff policy adopted by most of the countries in the 
region. 
 
4.7 Risks 
Despite the overall positive image of the land privatization issue, certain risks connected to 
the land question remain. The first is the scarcity of agricultural land in the densely 
populated Southern provinces – with an average population density of 24.1 persons per 
km² for the whole country, the three Southern provinces of Batken, Jalalabat and Osh all 
range high above the average. The Osh province is the most densely populated with 40.3 
persons per km², with Suzak district housing 91, Kara-Suu district 106.5, and Aravan district 
even 147.5 persons per km².62 To date, pressure on land has been eased by internal and 
external migration – either to Bishkek and the Northern Chui province or to Russia.63 
However, if the population will grow as predicted by UN Habitat or the World Bank,64 the 
pressure on land will increase and consequently, given a lack of economic perspectives for 
the young, so will the potential for social unrest.65 This can only be counteracted by 
economic development beyond the agricultural sector. 
A second concern is the global climate change that affects Central Asia as well as the rest 
of the world. With so many people depending on agriculture, and water being a scarce 
resource, global warming may have a devastating impact on regional stability. The first 
region that comes to mind with regard to water issues is the Ferghana Valley, i.e. the three 
Southern provinces of Kyrgyzstan. However, the climate change is felt in the other regions 
as well – farmers on the Northern shore of Lake Yssyk Köl complained about a lack of 
  
 
______________________ 
60  Interview in Bishkek, April 2004. 
61  Interview in Karakol and Naryn, April 2004. 
62  http://www.investment.kg/matrix_IV_02_project_02; http://stat-gvc.bishkek.su/English/index.html (National 
Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic) both October 2004. 
63  The UN System in the Kyrgyz Republic. Common Country Assessment 2003: 39; 65. 
64  http://www.unhabitat.org/habrdd/conditions/socentasia/kyrgys.htm 
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/modules/social/pgr/dataeuro.html; both October 2004 
65  Lubin, Nancy and Rubin, Barnett R. 1999: Calming the Ferghana Valley. New York: The Century Foundation 
Press. 60. 
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rainfall, while in Talas province, they reportedly have to dig deeper and deeper in order to 
reach ground water.66 Still, thanks to its glaciers and high mountain spring rivers, 
Kyrgyzstan is much better off than neighboring Uzbekistan. However, the dependency of 
the Kyrgyz economy on agriculture leaves the country vulnerable to climatic changes. 
 
4.8 Recommendations 
The pressure on land, especially in the South of Kyrgyzstan, could be met best by the 
economic development of the region: If agriculture loses its predominance for economic 
survival, the attractiveness of land possession will decline and with it, the pressure on 
agricultural land. Economic development of the Ferghana Valley, however, faces at least 
two structural obstacles – the remoteness of the region and the lack of interstate 
cooperation. While the problem of remoteness has been addressed by improving the road 
connections to the respective capitals (esp. the roads Tashkent-Quqon and Bishkek-Osh) 
and plans for a new railroad from Jalalabat to China exist, there are other measures that 
could be introduced, such as improving the flight connections to the region (e.g. re-
establishment of flights from Moscow to Osh or ensuring better connection flights at 
Bishkek airport).67
Linked with the question of infrastructure is the issue of regional cooperation. Despite the 
common past, all the Central Asian countries have adopted a foreign policy that focuses on 
the relations with countries lying farther away rather than on a consistent policy of good 
neighborhood. Furthermore, most of the documents on “Eternal Friendship“ or free trade 
are not worth the paper they were written on. The foreign policies relying on Realpolitik 
rather than on mutual benefits of cooperation can – to a certain extent – be explained by 
the relatively new phenomenon of statehood in the region. The main obstacle to regional 
cooperation, the border issue, will be discussed later on in this document.  
 
66  Interviews with farmers in Talas and Yssyk Köl regions, April 2004. 
67  By October 2004, there were flights from the Kyrgyz Ferghana Valley to the country’s capital, to the UAE and 
to Dushanbe. The Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley has much more connections, including flights to 
different domestic destinations and Russian cities. The same holds true for the Tajik part. The Kyrgyz and 
Tajik capitals are both connected with the other country’s part of the Ferghana Valley, whereas it is 
noteworthy that there are no flights from Uzbekistan to neither the Tajik nor the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana 
Valley, and no flights from the Uzbek part of the Valley to the Kyrgyz and Tajik capitals. This is one more 
indication for Uzbekistan’s often cited isolationist tendencies. 
Ethnicity, Regionalism, Borders, and their Interaction 
 27
 
5 Ethnicity, Regionalism, Borders, and their 
Interaction 
Throughout Central Asia, ethnic diversity is a major issue of discussion. Parallels drawn 
between Central Asia and the Balkans, even talk about a “balkanization” of Central Asia, 
point to the (apparent) danger of ethnic violence.68 This chapter aims at analyzing 
interethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan by attempting to find answers to questions such as: 
Which of the interethnic relations are relevant? What potential for violence do they 
possess? What are the restraining and the encouraging factors for possible interethnic 
violence? In what relationship does interethnic coexistence stand to interstate relations? Is 
interethnic violence inevitable, and, if no, what are the measures to be taken to avoid 
interethnic violence? 
This chapter, however, will not deal with theoretical frameworks and abstract concepts of 
ethnicity but will acknowledge that there are different ethnicities with distinct identities. 
On another level, this chapter will also deal with regionalism within the ethnic group of the 
Kyrgyz. It will provide some degree of analysis of the often cited divide between the North 
and the South of the country and try to show interactions of this division with the ethnic 
question. 
 
5.1 Ethnicities in Kyrgyzstan 
As the term “Kyrgyzstan” suggests, the country is “the Land of the Kyrgyz.”69 This term is 
obviously exclusive, since the meaning of “Land of the Kyrgyz” stands in juxtaposition to 
the “lands“ of all others. However, unlike its neighbors, for official purposes, Kyrgyzstan 
mainly uses the term “Kyrgyz Respublikasy” or Kyrgyz Republic, which is slightly more 
inclusive than, for instance, “O’zbekiston Respublikasi” or “Republic of the Land of the 
Uzbeks.” Whether this official term is deliberately used because of ethnic sensitivities 
remains open. 
The “Land of the Kyrgyz,” however, is not inhabited by the titular nation alone: according 
to different sources, there are more than ninety different ethnicities in Kyrgyzstan. The table 
below shows the ethnic diversity of Kyrgyzstan.70
 
 
 
______________________ 
68  Krummenacher, Heinz: Conflict Prevention and Power Politics: Central Asia as a Show Case. Berne 2001, 
p. 8. 
69  “Istan“ is the Persian word for “land.“ In this sense, it is a frequently used term in different languages to 
point to “the land of a nation.“ In addition to the known examples from Central Asia, the Turkish terms 
“Bulgaristan,“ “Hindistan,“ “Macaristan“ (=Land of the Magyars, the Hungarians), “Ermenistan“ for 
Armenia (= Land of the Armenians) or the Armenian “Hajastan“ for the same country, provide further 
evidence. 
70  National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic: Results of the First National Population Census of the 
Kyrgyz Republic of 1999. 
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 Total population In % of total population 
 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 
Total population 3,522,832 4,257,755 4,822,938 100 100 100
Kyrgyz  1,687,382 2,229,663 3,128,147 47,9 52,4 64,9 
Uzbeks  426,194 550,096 664,950 12,1 12,9 13,8 
Russians  911,703 916,558 603,201 25,9 21,5 12,5 
Dungans  26,661 36,928 51,766 0,8 0,9 1,1 
Ukrainians  109,324 108,027 50,442 3,1 2,5 1,0 
Uigurs  29,817 36,779 46,944 0,8 0,9 1,0 
Tatars  71,744 70,068 45,438 2,0 1,6 0,9 
Kazakhs  27,442 37,318 42,657 0,8 0,9 0,9 
Tajiks  23,209 33,518 42,636 0,7 0,8 0,9 
Turks  5,160 21,294 33,327 0,1 0,5 0,7 
Germans  101,057 101,309 21,471 2,9 2,4 0,4 
Koreans  14,481 18,355 19,784 0,4 0,4 0,4 
Others  88,658 97,842 72,175 2,5 2,3 1,5 
 
Despite the high degree of fragmentation, the ethnic question is only posed between a few 
ethnicities. One first differentiation can be made between “European“ and “Central Asian“ 
peoples, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans as one group, and all the other peoples as 
the other group. Whereas there is a certain degree of homogeneity in the “European“ 
group, the cleavages within the “Central Asian“ group are at least as deep as between the 
two major groups. These cleavages will be discussed further on. 
When talking to representatives of different ethnic groups throughout the country, and 
especially Kyrgyz, about questions of nationhood, state, and ethnicity, the general 
impression is that many fear that their country and subsequently, their people, might be 
assimilated by larger neighboring nations. In addition to the fear of China throughout 
Central Asia, practically all other neighbors, depending on the region, are also feared. The 
fear of the Chinese is most persistent in Naryn and Yssyk Köl provinces, while in Jalalabat 
and Osh, the fear of the Uzbeks is dominant. Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks seem to be interested in 
participating in political life but Kyrgyz try to exclude them, because they suspect them of 
forming some kind of a “Fifth Column” aiming at unification with Uzbekistan. In the 
Batken province, especially in the border villages in Batken and Leilek Raions, the main fear 
is of a “creeping migration” from Tajikistan. Although the weakest among the fears, there  
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is a perception of a possible “Kazakhization” in the North of the country (Talas, Chui) 
should the capital be transferred to the Southern city of Osh in order to foster internal 
stability.71
This climate of fear is certainly not contributing to overcome ethnic divisions in Kyrgyzstan. 
It is, however, a factor that has to be included in an analysis focusing on interethnic 
relations, since it is only by addressing these deep-rooted fears that the majority segment 
can be convinced of the merits of a more inclusive political system. 
 
5.2 “Central Asian-European Relations“ 
With regard to the “inter-racial“72 relations, it has to be stated that since 1991, the 
formerly dominant influence of the “Europeans“ has receded: While during Soviet times, 
directors of Kolkhoz or production plants used to be of European nationality with a Central 
Asian deputy, this relationship has since been inversed. Although there is no direct 
discrimination of Europeans, the fact that for many (official) posts, Kyrgyz is the official 
language, can be seen as an indirect discrimination of the non-Kyrgyz-speaking group. 
Since most Europeans (and several Central Asians, too) do not have a professional 
command of Kyrgyz, this requirement effectively equals direct discrimination.73 This 
language policy, albeit more liberal than in its neighbor republics,74 is one of the main 
reasons for the huge number of Europeans who have left the country since its 
independence. For many Russians, it is also difficult to accept that they are no longer the 
leading elite of the country. The attitude of many Russians towards the Kyrgyz is not hostile 
but characterized by a high degree of arrogance. Statements such as “The Kyrgyz are not 
able to work and to manage their country” are frequent when talking to Russians living in 
Kyrgyzstan.75 This attitude, combined with the de facto exclusion from the political 
decision-making process and exaggeratedly negative perceptions of the security situation, 
leads to a pessimistic view of the future and is probably the most convincing explanation 
  
 
 
______________________ 
71  Interviews in different provinces, April 2004. 
72  Inter-racial in this context means “all Central Asians vs. Europeans.” The differences within the Central 
Asian group will be discussed later on. 
73  The language question is hotly debated in Kyrgyzstan. According to the Constitution, “The Kyrgyz language 
shall be a state language of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Russian language shall be used in the Kyrgyz Republic 
as an official language.” (Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2). Although paragraph 4 states that “[...]rights and 
the freedom of citizens shall not be abridged on account of ignorance of the state or official languages,” 
there is an effective discrimination, since the new law on state language of 2004 aims at introducing Kyrgyz 
as the only official language by 2015. The most discriminating point with regard to the language is the need 
for command of the state language for presidential candidates. 
74  Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian country where the language of the titular nation and Russian have 
almost the same position. While in Kazakhstan, Russian is still very much present, the situation is completely 
different in Tajikistan (where there are practically no Russians left) and Uzbekistan, which had even changed 
from a Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. 
75  Interviews in Bishkek and Yssyk Köl, 1999-2004. 
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for the massive emigration of Europeans to their “motherlands“ and beyond.76 However, 
Russians from Russia do not perceive Russians who migrated from Central Asia to Russia or 
Central and Western Europe as Russians. The former group themselves feel the “impact of 
Asia.“77
Kyrgyz usually do not have all too negative feelings towards Russians. They are viewed, on 
one hand, as colonizers who have settled on foreign land and are merely tolerated but do 
not have any influence. On the other hand, many Kyrgyz attribute the relative economic 
and social progress the country has enjoyed under Russian influence to their role as 
“civilizers,“ where women’s rights, infrastructure, and education are the main 
achievements of Russian domination.78
Overall, the relationship between “Central Asians“ and “Europeans“ is not too bad, and 
there can definitely be no talk of an “inter-racial“ hostile climate. Nevertheless, the 
emigration of “Europeans“ can be regarded as some kind of “Vote with your Feet,“ 
although there is also a non-negligible number of ethnic Kyrgyz who leave the country, 
which reflects the general economic situation.79 The only way to stop emigration is by 
providing an economic perspective for every citizen, an aim which Kyrgyzstan must still go 
a long way to achieve. 
 
5.3 Relations Between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks – a “Frozen Conflict”? 
The relationship with the highest potential for violent conflict is the relationship between 
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The outbreak of violence in 1990 in the Southern cities of Özgön and 
Osh, where, according to different sources, between three hundred and one thousand 
people were killed, goes to prove this. Without entering into any details, it must be stated 
that the Osh ethnic conflict was the bloodiest ethnically motivated conflict Central Asia has 
seen for decades.80 International observers in the region paint a rather contradictory picture 
of the current situation: While some point to the resumption of interethnic weddings in 
Osh, others have the impression that they can “hear the walls rising” between the two 
groups.81 With positions differing to such an extent, any analysis is encumbered and 
vulnerable to critique from every side. 
 
 
76  In this context, the emigration of Russians to Russia, Germans to Germany, and Jews to Israel has the 
highest significance. 
77  Interview in with a Russian emigrant from Kyrgyzstan in a major Central European city, February 2003. 
78  Interview in Bishkek, September 1999. 
79  The UN System in the Kyrgyz Republic. Common Country Assessment 2003: 40. 
80  For more information on the Osh ethnic conflict c.f.: Tishkov, Valery 1995: “Don’t Kill Me, I’m a Kyrgyz!“: An 
Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, vol. 32, no. 2 
(May). 133-149. 
81  Interviews in Jalalabat and Osh, April 2004. 
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5.3.1 Problems 
The occurrence of interethnic violence in Osh and Özgön is not accidental: The problems 
surrounding the relations between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks are concentrated in the South of the 
country where most of the Uzbek minority lives. While the Kyrgyz have nomadic traditions 
of cattle breeding, Uzbeks have a history of sedentariness and agricultural life. This 
explains why Uzbeks have settled in the fertile plains of the Ferghana Valley while Kyrgyz 
have stayed at the foothills (e.g. Tishkov: 134). Since Uzbeks have a much longer tradition 
of agricultural work and, consequently, trade, they are considered to be more successful 
and slier (see chapter 4.3.). The sedentariness of the Uzbeks also helps to explain their 
generally higher degree of religiosity compared to the Kyrgyz. They were able to build 
mosques and Medressahs in the towns and villages where the Uzbeks lived. The lack of 
institutionalized Islam, is considered as the main factor for the higher degree of secularity 
among Kyrgyz than Uzbeks. 
What are the problems the Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations suffer from? In addition to the above-
mentioned fear of an “Uzbekization” of the South and the formation of a “Fifth Column” 
by the Uzbeks, Kyrgyz often view the Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks as being economically more 
successful. Whether this holds true or not does not matter – the fact that this prejudice 
exists, is enough to pose a danger for interethnic stability. With labor migration of Uzbeks 
from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan, where they allegedly can earn almost twice the salary of 
Uzbekistan and still earn less than locals, there is a possibility of Kyrgyz economic 
jealousy.82 Another problem is that “Islamist activity” in Kyrgyzstan is often attributed to 
ethnic Uzbeks, which used to hold true for a certain time (re. below). From the other, the 
Uzbek perspective, there is a widespread feeling of exclusion from power and general 
discrimination on ethnic grounds.  
However, the main problems occur on a very local level, be it disputes over land, water, or 
border posts. These difficulties vary tremendously from community to community: While 
there can be tensions over the allocation of land in one village, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz coexist 
peacefully in the neighboring village.83 Therefore, micro-projects that identify target 
communities without exacerbating the tensions (or even evoking them) and try to remove 
the reason for the specific conflict in the specific area are absolutely necessary. There is, 
however, the risk of “self-fulfilling prophecy,” i.e. if a community is targeted by an 
international or local organization only because it is ethnically mixed, without an analysis 
of the conflict potential as such. An in-depth knowledge of the local circumstances is 
indispensable. 
 
______________________ 
82  Interviews in Jalalabat and Osh, April 2004, IRINNews 11 September 2003. 
83  A further danger according to the interview partners in Jalalabat is the increase in rice production: with rice 
production being extremely irrigation-intensive, disputes over water between neighboring communities bear 
a certain potential for aggravation. Interview in Jalalabat, April 2004. 
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5.3.2 Restraining factors 
The first and foremost restraining factor for interethnic violence is the very occurrence of it 
in 1990. The term “Oshskie Sobytiya,“ “Osh events,“ has been burned into the memories 
of the ordinary people as well as the political elite, and there is a high degree of 
mystification and “tabooization“ of these events.84 Avoiding a reoccurrence of this national 
tragedy is most probably the main goal behind the President’s campaign of “Kyrgyzstan, 
our common home“ which aims at national unity regardless of the ethnic background and 
translates into the backing of the current government by ethnic minorities (see 3.6).85
A second restraining factor can be seen in the fact that both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz share the 
same religion (Sunni Islam) and speak a similar language. With regard to religion and 
traditions, the cleavage between the North and the South of the country is at least as large 
as the one between Southerners and Uzbeks: The more secularized and the more 
“russianized“ North of Kyrgyzstan dominates the country not only economically but also 
politically. The perception of the Southerners as not being “real Kyrgyz” but “half Kyrgyz 
half Uzbek,”86 of course, is not acceptable to Southern Kyrgyz. This notion, however, can be 
explained by the general impression of the South being more conservative in different 
ways. Therefore, the crossing of two societal fault lines has a positive impact on interethnic 
relations – it is not only the Uzbeks who feel discriminated but also the Southern Kyrgyz, 
and there is even the possibility of unification of Uzbeks and Southern Kyrgyz with regard 
to action taken in Bishkek. 
A third restraining factor is the addressing of ethnicity-specific needs by the central 
government. With the establishment of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University in Osh and the 
introduction of Uzbek textbooks written in the Uzbekistani-Latin script, much of the overall 
tension has been eased.87
Last but not least, there is a wide range of mutual cooperation between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks 
on a local level, e.g. Uzbeks from the lowlands entrusting Kyrgyz shepherds with their 
cattle during summer; or interethnic marriages that had come to a virtual halt after the Osh 
riots but are currently increasing once more.88 It is these local ties that can help people to 
build up confidence and mutual understanding. 
84  Rumors go as far as pointing to the KGB as the initiator of the riots. Whether this is true or not is obviously 
difficult to assess and a task to be left to historians. 
85  In the Kyrgyz public, the notion of the “common home“ is transmogrified into “dormitory,“ since the sound 
of “Obshiy Dom“ (common house) and “Obshezhitie“ (dormitory) are quite similar. 
86  Interview in Talas, April 2004. 
87  Interviews in Bishkek and Jalalabat, April 2004. 
88  Interview in Osh, April 2004. 
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5.3.3 External Factors – Uzbekistan 
Dangers 
As mentioned above, there is a certain fear among the Kyrgyz that larger neighboring 
countries might threaten Kyrgyz statehood. The main source for this fear is Uzbekistan, and 
this for several reasons: 
1. Significant Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan 
2. Significantly larger population in Uzbekistan (more than five times the population 
of Kyrgyzstan) 
3. Perception of a foreign policy by Uzbekistan aiming at regional hegemony, 
combined with the strongest army in the region 
4. Possible political instability in Uzbekistan 
5. Uzbekistan’s border policy 
6. Higher degree of religiosity among Uzbeks 
Ad 1: 
The fear of the Uzbek minority posing a “Fifth column” has already been mentioned. On a 
local level, this latent mistrust carries a certain potential for violent conflict, especially 
when combined with the other factors (re. below). 
Ad 2 et 3: 
With a population of more than 26 million, Uzbekistan outnumbers Kyrgyzstan more than 
five times. Although a certain feeling of inferiority is nothing to worry about, in the Central 
Asian context, it is combined with uncertainty. Is the larger neighbor really to be trusted? 
What are the country's intensions? Despite different pathetic notions of “Eternal 
Friendship”89 the yet unconsolidated statehoods in Central Asia and the generally realistic 
foreign policy (i.e. the lack of perception for mutual win-win bargains among nations) leads 
the governments to prefer relying on partners farther away than on mutual cooperation 
with neighbors. From the Uzbek point of view, Kyrgyzstan is not to be trusted either, albeit 
not due to its size: With the incursion of fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 
1999 and 2000 into Southern Kyrgyzstan and to some extent into Uzbekistan, the Uzbek 
government accused Kyrgyzstan of not being able to control its territory and borders. While 
there is some truth in the argument, a deeper reasoning behind this accusation is obvious: 
If the relatively democratic neighbor were successful, then the regime of Uzbek President 
Karimov would have difficulties justifying its tough stance towards political dissent. 
 
 
______________________ 
89  A “Treaty on Eternal Friendship” between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was signed in 1996. 
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Ad 4: 
In April 2004, just a few days after the shoot-outs in and around Tashkent, Bukhara and 
other cities of Uzbekistan, several interlocutors in Kyrgyzstan were very anxious about the 
events in the neighboring country. The answers with regard to the impact of domestic 
Uzbek policies on Kyrgyzstan ranged from general statements on regional security to the 
notion of Uzbekistan falling apart into five to six Khanates.90 The impact of such a 
development on Kyrgyzstan would be mainly economic, since the country would have to 
deal with many refugees from Uzbekistan. According to the interlocutors, the massive 
police check-points at the borders of the different Viloyati (provinces) illustrate the danger 
of Uzbekistan falling apart. Regardless of the probability of such a scenario, the question 
remains as to which extent such a development would affect Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks. If a new, 
independent state were indeed to emerge out of the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley, the 
consequences for all of Central Asia would be unforeseeable. Major territorial shifts 
affecting Kyrgyzstan as well as Tajikistan would be inevitable and the IMU’s notion of a 
united “Khanate of Ferghana,“ a revival of the ancient “Khanate of Quqon,“ would 
materialize. However, for the time being, such a development seems very unlikely, 
although not entirely impossible. Another danger with regard to Uzbekistan’s (and, for that 
matter, Kyrgyzstan’s) political stability is the possible raise of nationalistic rhetoric by 
political leaders in order to cover internal grievances. The canalization of dissatisfaction 
and lack of perspective towards an external threat, with the aim of uniting the people 
behind a certain political leader, is a common political pattern. 
Ad 5: 
With the jigsaw – borders between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan virtually sealed off, which 
imposes difficulties for both Kyrgyz and Uzbek residents in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 
there is a certain danger that Kyrgyz will project the policy of Uzbekistan’s government 
downwards, to the group of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks. In other words, Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks would 
be held responsible for the border policy of the Uzbek government.91 However, whether this 
projection is really made by a major part of the Southern Kyrgyz population remains open, 
since it would require further sociological research. 
Ad 6: 
Whereas there is a higher degree of religiosity in Southern than in Northern Kyrgyzstan, 
there is a differentiation in the South between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz: Women wearing 
a Burqa are immediately identified by Kyrgyz as Uzbeks, “our women don’t wear that kind 
of thing.”92 This statement perfectly describes the pattern of ethnicity and religiosity, 
according to which Islamic fundamentalism in Kyrgyzstan is a Kyrgyzstani Uzbek problem.93 
However, in recent months, although there is some truth to this pattern held so dear by 
certain Kyrgyz representatives, the theory has experienced some scratches. The appearance  
90  Interviews in Bishkek, Jalalabat and Osh, April 2004. The main distinctions were made between Ferghanis, 
Tashkentis, Samarqandis, and Bukharis. 
91  Interviews in Jalalabat, April 2004. 
92  Interview and personal observation in Özgön, April 2004. 
93  International Crisis Group 2003: Radical Islam in Central Asia. Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir. Osh/Brussels, 
(30 June). 18. 
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of leaflets of the banned radical party, Hizb u -Tah ir, in the Northern Chui, Talas, and 
Yssyk Köl provinces in light of an almost complete absence of ethnic Uzbeks in these areas, 
point to the engagement of ethnic Kyrgyz in radical agitation.
t r
 
______________________ 
94 Nevertheless, radical Islam 
remains tightly associated with ethnic Uzbeks. The problem lies in the fact that members of 
organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir are mainly Uzbeks, whereas most policemen are 
Kyrgyz: Therefore, if an alleged member of a radical organization is arrested, it is most 
likely that a Kyrgyz will arrest an Uzbek. This fact, however, is hardly exploited, since the 
combination of ethnic and religious radicalism has no broad support and it would be 
political suicide for Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbeks. 
Islamic radicalism in Kyrgyzstan can also have an impact on the relations with Uzbekistan. 
This has been shown by the latter’s reaction to the incursion of fighters of the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan from Kyrgyz territory into Uzbekistan. The mining of the common 
border by Uzbekistan as a “measure of self-defense“ is a direct consequence of the 
perception of Kyrgyzstan not being able to protect its borders and fight Islamic radicalism 
on its own territory. This perception of the neighbor by the political elite in Uzbekistan can, 
if exploited, lead to an increase of negative sentiments among the broader population (re. 
Tajikistan). 
Opportunities 
Although it might sound somewhat cynical, Uzbekistan’s authoritarian regime and 
especially its economic decline, could have a stabilizing effect for Kyrgyzstan in the short- 
and mid-term. Calls for a unification with the motherland, a policy of “Anschluss” or “Heim 
ins Reich,” lose their attractiveness if they are not backed by a perspective.95 With peons 
from Uzbekistan crossing the officially closed border to Kyrgyzstan almost daily in search of 
work, Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbeks remain very well informed on the situation in Uzbekistan, and 
the country’s bleak economic situation, combined with its authoritarian political system are 
rather uninviting.96 Moreover, Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks are not necessarily perceived as Uzbeks 
in Uzbekistan, although many of them hold both passports.97
Another positive aspect is the time factor. In the first years after the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, the call for a redrawing of the borders might have been more appealing than today. 
The more time passes, the more people get used to their new states – for Kyrgyzstani 
Uzbeks, being a citizen of Kyrgyzstan is natural, because they know no alternative. With 
regard to border issues, there have been some slightly positive signs: The work of the joint 
commission for border demarcation is progressing, although not at a very high speed, and 
Uzbekistan started de-mining parts of the common border in August 2004.98 The clearance 
of mines, combined with a less restrictive border crossing regime, would certainly ease 
  
94  This statement is confirmed by an interview in Karakol, April 2004. 
95  International Crisis Group 2002: Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential. Osh/Brussels, (4 April). 
13. 
96  Interview in Jalalabat, April 2004. 
97  Interview in Osh, April 2004. 
98  FAST Database, 17 August 2004. 
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tension on the local as well as on interstate level. However, taking into account 
Uzbekistan’s need for security, Kyrgyzstan must ensure a certain degree of control over 
elements Uzbekistan regards as threats - provided control remains within the framework of 
Kyrgyzstan’s and international standards on human rights. 
 
5.4 Kyrgyz-Tajik Relations – an Underestimated Conflict Potential? 
The table in chapter 5.1. shows that the percentage of ethnic Tajiks among the population 
of the country is a quantité négligeable, so why dedicate an entire chapter to them? The 
Tajiks account for less than one percent of the overall population and are indeed one of the 
smallest ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan. However, their local concentration and their 
distinction of origin from both the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks places them in a special position. 
With regard to language, Uzbeks are the minority best suited to adopt the state language: 
Both Uzbek and Kyrgyz are Turkic languages with quite high a degree of similarity. With 
Tajik, the situation is completely different: Being a Persian language, Tajik is not 
understandable for either Uzbeks or Kyrgyz.99  
On a local level, especially in certain areas of the Batken and Leilek Raions of the Batken 
Oblast, conflicts over land and water do not arise between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks but between 
Kyrgyz and Tajiks. One of the main problems is the yet uncompleted demarcation of the 
border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.100 Out of this lack of clarity, disputes over land 
and water arise with a different degree of intensity in several places. Furthermore, the 
respective countries do not seem to be keen on resolving this problem any time soon, since 
for both of them, the region concerned is very peripheral. Some Kyrgyz consider this delay 
in the demarcation process to be a Tajik tactic, because Tajiks are said to have a higher 
birth rate, thereby attempting to produce facts by means of what is referred to as “creeping 
migration.“101 The peripheral location of the region, however, seems to be a more probable 
explanation. 
On an interstate level, the relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is probably one 
of the best in the region, mainly because of their common fear of dominant Uzbekistan. The 
common construction of the Batken-Kanibodom 220-kV transmission line is just one 
example of bilateral cooperation. Both countries lack natural resources except for water. 
Therefore, there is a common interest in negotiating deals with downstream countries 
(mainly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to a lesser extent Turkmenistan). The notion made by 
an interlocutor in Osh in April 2004 that the relations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
are more dangerous than those between the former and Uzbekistan because of the cultural 
/ linguistic distance does not seem to hold true, if one considers the common interests of 
both countries. 
99  For Uzbekistan with its high percentage of ethnic Tajiks, the situation is somewhat different – there are 
many Tajik expressions that were adopted by the Uzbek language. Interviews in Buxoro (Uzbekistan) and 
Khujend (Tajikistan), August and September 2003. 
100  The same holds true for several border regions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
101 Interviews in Chorku (Tajikistan), September 2003, and Batken province, April 2004. 
Conclusions 
 37
 
6 Conclusions 
As the analysis has shown, Kyrgyzstan faces problems in different fields, especially in the 
political and social ones. On a political level, the main question is whether the tendency 
towards an ever increasing authoritarianism will continue or whether Kyrgyzstan will 
manage to become a model for a peaceful democratic change of power which could impact 
on the whole Central Asian region. For the time being, there are developments pointing 
into both directions: On the one hand, Kyrgyzstan’s political space is comparatively lively, 
with possibilities of freedom of expression unheard of in neighboring countries. President 
Akaev’s promise to leave office in accordance with the constitution and his readiness to 
hand over the political future of the country to the younger generation can be considered a 
very positive signal. On the other hand, harassment of prominent opposition figures ahead 
of the parliamentary elections on 27 February 2005, can be interpreted as the regime’s 
determination not to leg go of any power. This assumption is fuelled by the sometimes 
even hysteric rhetoric from the government’s side in the wake of the “Orange Revolution“ 
in Ukraine. However, the Kyrgyz government seems to be seriously committed to abide by 
international standards for the parliamentary elections, assured by the provisions taken not 
to let any opposition candidate become too serious a threat. 
For the government it is important to show the image of free and fair elections to the 
international community in order to remain credible. While a certain emphasis on the 
process (transparent and fair elections) is necessary beyond any doubt, the reasoning must 
go on beyond 30 October 2005 and focus on the issue of the kind of future that would be 
desirable for Kyrgyzstan. Depending on the point of view of the observer, this analysis will 
differ: While some might focus on the fight against radical Islamism or on maintaining the 
interethnic balance, others might emphasize economic prosperity and regional cooperation. 
The international community, especially Western donor countries with a certain financial 
leverage, can attempt to influence processes as well as future political actors. In light of the 
recent events in Ukraine and the accusations made by the Russian and Central Asian sides 
regarding Western “meddling in internal affairs,“ this form of exerting influence must be 
carried out very carefully in order to avoid provoking nationalistic reflexes that could be 
exploited by the ruling elite in their favor. The avoidance of provoking nationalistic reflexes 
is crucial for a Kyrgyzstan’s inter-ethnic stability. While the question on whether ethnic 
diversity poses a danger to peaceful coexistence per se is highly disputable, its exploitation 
for political ends has to be prevented at any cost. Ethnicity is frequently used as a tool for 
social mobilization on other, mainly economic and/or power issues. Furthermore, there 
must be a “political entrepreneur“ who consciously exploits ethnic differences for his or her 
aims. For the time being, this is not the case in Kyrgyzstan or in Uzbekistan. However, the 
international community has to monitor developments closely in order to be able to 
steadfastly react should there arise any signs of an increase in ethnicity-based propaganda. 
As the above analysis has shown, at present, there are no signs for an immediate danger of 
massive ethnic violence. On the contrary, the situation can be described as stable, although 
resentments and prejudices persist. Still, there is room for projects aiming at easing 
interethnic tensions on a local level. Such projects usually either try to foster interethnic 
understanding by bringing both communities together (sports, cultural events, etc.) or aim 
at eliminating the potential source of tension (e.g. by reestablishing irrigation 
infrastructure) that might lead to interethnic conflict. Nevertheless, actors working in the 
area of conflict prevention must constantly be aware of the danger of a “self-fulfilling 
prophecy” and avoid ethnicization of problems that are not necessarily ethnic in nature. 
This requires a constant monitoring of actors’ activities with regard to this. As the example 
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of the land privatization process has shown, there is room for real reforms and progress, 
and the Kyrgyz government is arguably the most receptive government in Central Asia for 
foreign support for its reforms. As the OSCE’s police training program demonstrates, 
foreign actors can even provide assistance in highly delicate spheres. Caution, however, 
must be exercised and all stakeholders involved. Furthermore – and quite obviously so – 
cooperation programs must be checked with regard to their impact and the ruling elites 
must be convinced of the necessity of various reforms. In times of large numbers of reports 
from Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan painting a rather pessimistic picture of the region, land 
privatization can be considered a success and proof of the fact that things are changing in 
Kyrgyzstan. Or, to say it with Galilei: “Eppur si muove!” 
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